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Abstract. Many advanced lattice based cryptosystems require to sam-
ple lattice points from Gaussian distributions. One challenge for this
task is that all current algorithms resort to floating-point arithmetic
(FPA) at some point, which has numerous drawbacks in practice: it
requires numerical stability analysis, extra storage for high-precision,
lazy/backtracking techniques for efficiency, and may suffer from weak
determinism which can completely break certain schemes.
In this paper, we give techniques to implement Gaussian sampling over
general lattices without using FPA. To this end, we revisit the appro-
ach of Peikert, using perturbation sampling. Peikert’s approach uses the
Cholesky decomposition Σ = AAt of the target covariance matrix Σ,
giving rise to a square matrix A with real (not integer) entries. Our
idea, in a nutshell, is to replace this decomposition by an integral one.
While there is in general no integer solution if we restrict A to being
a square matrix, we show that such a decomposition can be efficiently
found by allowing A to be wider (say n × 9n). This can be viewed as
an extension of Lagrange’s four-square theorem to matrices. In addition,
we adapt our integral decomposition algorithm to the ring setting: for
power-of-2 cyclotomics, we can exploit the tower of rings structure for
improved complexity and compactness.
Keywords: Lattice based cryptography · Discrete Gaussian sampling ·
Matrix decomposition
1 Introduction
Lattice based cryptography is a promising post-quantum alternative to cryp-
tography based on integer factorization and discrete logarithms. One of its at-
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tractive features is that lattices can be used to build various powerful crypto-
graphic primitives including identity based encryption (IBE) [GPV08, CHKP10,
ABB10, DLP14], attribute based encryption (ABE) [BGG+14, GVW13], functi-
onal encryption [AFV11], group signatures [LLLS13, LLNW14, NZZ15] and so
on [Gen09, BV11]. A core component of many advanced lattice based cryptosys-
tems is sampling lattice points from discrete Gaussians, given a short basis (i.e.
a trapdoor) [GPV08, Pei10, MP12].
Gaussian sampling is important to prevent leaking secret information. In-
deed early lattice trapdoors have suffered from statistical attacks [NR06, DN12b,
YD18]. In 2008, Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan first showed that Gaussian
distributions [GPV08] can prevent such leaks, and that Klein’s algorithm [Kle00]
could sample efficiently from a negligibly close distribution. This algorithm uses
the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization, which requires either arithmetic over the
rationals with very large denominators, or floating-point approximations. An
alternative algorithm was proposed in [Pei10], where most of the expensive com-
putation, including floating-point arithmetic, can be done in an offline phase at
the cost of somewhat increasing the width of the sampled Gaussian. This techni-
que turned out to be particularly convenient in the lattice-trapdoor framework
of Micciancio and Peikert [MP12].
Although the online sampling can be rather efficient [MP12, GM18] and fully
performed over the integers [DDLL13], high-precision floating-point arithmetic
is still heavily used in the offline phase, i.e. the perturbation sampling. We now
list some of the numerous drawbacks of high-precision FPA when it comes to
practical efficiency and security in the wild.
– First, one needs to perform a tedious numerical stability analysis to deter-
mine what level of precision is admissible, and how much security is lost. In-
deed, while such analysis may be reasonable when done asymptotically, doing
a concrete and tight analysis requires significant effort [DN12a, PDG14,
Pre17], and may be considered too error-prone for deployed cryptography.
– Second, for a security level of λ-bits, it incurs significant storage overheads
as one requires at least a precision of λ/2 bits4 for each matrix entry, while
the trapdoor basis itself only needs log(s) bits per entry, where s = poly(λ)
in simple cryptosystems.
– Thirdly, the requirement for high-precision arithmetic would significantly
slow down those sampling algorithms (may it be fix-point or floating-point
arithmetic). While it has been shown in [DN12a] that one can do most of
the operations at lower precision, the proposed technique requires compli-
cated backtracking, and high-precision arithmetic from time to time. While
asymptotically interesting, it is unclear whether this technique is practical;
in particular it has, to our knowledge never been implemented. It also seems
particularly hard to protect against timing attacks.
– Finally we mention the intrinsic weak determinism of floating-point arithme-
tic. It is essential to de-randomize trapdoor sampling, as revealing two diffe-
4 unless one assumes strong bounds on the number of attackers queries, as done
in [Pre17].
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rent vectors close to a single target instantly reveals a (secret) short vector of
the lattice. Even with the same random stream, we need to assume that the
rest of the algorithm is deterministic. In the case of high-precision arithme-
tic, one would for example have to assume that the mpfr library behaves
exactly the same across different architectures and versions. But even at low
precision, the use of native floats can be tricky despite deterministic IEEE
standards. For example, while both Add and Multiply instructions are de-
terministically defined by the IEEE standard, the standard also allows the
combined ‘Multiply-and-Accumulate’ instruction to behave differently
from applying both instructions sequentially, as long as the result is at least
as precise [Wil]. As FPA addition is not associative, it is crucial to specify
the order of operations for matrix-vector products as part of the scheme, and
to not leave it as an implementation detail. Furthermore, compilers such as
gcc do not guarantee determinism when considering code optimization over
floating-point computation [mir].
Our contribution. We present a new perturbation sampling algorithm in which
no floating-point arithmetic is used. Compared with the Peikert’s algorithm [Pei10],
our new algorithm has the following features. A more detailed comparison is
available in Section 5, with Tables 2 and 3.
– Similar quality. The final Gaussian width s achieved by our technique is only
larger than its minimum by a factor of 1 + o(1): the parameters of the whole
cryptosystems will be unaffected.
– No need for FPA and less precision. All operations are performed over inte-
gers of length about log s, while previous algorithms required floating points
with a mantissa of length at least λ/2 + log s.
– Less memory. While the intermediate matrix, i.e. the Gram root of the co-
variance, is rectangular, it is integral and of somewhat structured, requi-
ring only ≈ n2 log s, instead of n2(λ+ log s)/2 bits for Cholesky decomposi-
tion [Pei10, MP12].
– Simpler base sampling. Only two kinds of base samplers are required: DZ,Lr
and DZ,r,c with c ∈ 1L · Z, where L can be any integer larger than a po-
lynomial bound; choosing L as a power of two is known to be particularly
convenient [MW17].
In summary, not only do we get rid of FPA and its weak determinism, we also
improve time and memory consumption; when s = poly(λ) this improvement
factor is quasilinear. In practice, it may allow to implement an HIBE or ABE
with a few levels before having to resort to multi-precision arithmetic (note that
the parameter s grows exponentially with the depth of such schemes).
Techniques. Our main idea stems from the observation that, at least in the
continuous case, sampling a Gaussian of covariance Σ can be done with using a
matrix A such that AAt = Σ, may A not be a square matrix. This idea was
already implicit in [Pei10, MW17], and we push it further.
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The first step is to prove that the above statement also holds in the discrete
case. We show that when A ·Zm = Zn, the distribution of Ax where x is drawn
from DZm,r is statistically close to DZn,r
√
AAt under some smoothness condition
with respect to the orthogonal lattice Λ⊥(A).
We then proceed to find such an integral Gram root A efficiently. Let the
Integral Gram Decomposition Problem denoted by IGDPn,B,d,m be as follows:
given an integral symmetric matrix Σ ∈ Zn×n with ‖Σ‖2 ≤ B, find an integral
matrix A ∈ Zn×m such that AAt = dIn−Σ. Aiming at IGDPn,B,d,m, our initial
method is recursive, and can be summarized as the following reduction
IGDPn,B,d,m → IGDPn−1,B′,d,m′
where B′ ≈ B, m = m′ + dlogbBe + 4 and b is the base of the used gadget
decomposition. The reduction is constructive: by gadget decomposition (also
called b-ary decomposition), one first finds a matrix T such that TTt has the
same first row and column as dIn−Σ except the diagonal element, and then clears
out the remaining diagonal element by the 4-square decomposition. However,
this decomposition requires d  B, which significantly enlarges the width of
corresponding Gaussian. To overcome this issue, we develop another tool called
eigenvalue reduction, which can be viewed as the following reduction:
IGDPn,B,d,m → IGDPn,B′,d−B,m−n
with B′  B. By eigenvalue reduction, the final overhead on the Gaussian
width is introduced during the decomposition on a small matrix, which beco-
mes negligible compared with the original parameter. Combining the integral
decomposition for d  B and the eigenvalue reduction, we arrive at a solution
to IGDPn,B,d,m of a somewhat large B, say B = ω(n
4). This is the case of some
advanced lattice based schemes, such as hierarchical IBE [ABB10, CHKP10] and
ABE [GVW13]. Furthermore, if a few, say O(log n), bits of rational precision are
permitted, we can find an almost integral Gram root for general positive definite
matrices.
The IGDPn,B,d,m is naturally generalized to the ring setting by adding the
underlying ring R as a parameter. To tackle the IGDPR,n,B,d,m problem, we
first study the special case IGDPR,1,B,d,m. We propose an analogue of 4-square
decomposition in the power-of-2 cyclotomic ring, i.e. R2w = Z[x]/(xw+1) where
w = 2l. The high level idea of our solution is summarized as a reduction
IGDPR2w,1,B,d,m → IGDPRw,1,B′,d′,m′
where B′ ≈ B, d = d′+ b2k−1b2−1 , m = m′+k and b is the gadget base, k = dlogbBe,
which projects the problem onto a subring. To build this reduction, we exploit
projection techniques similar to [ABD16, DP16, GM18, PP19]. The resulting
integral decomposition inherits the tower of rings structure and hence can be
stored efficiently despite the output being wider by a factor of O(logw). Finally,
this decomposition in the ring setting can be combined with the previous integral
setting algorithm to yield an algorithm for solving IGDPR2w,n,B,d,m.
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Related work. While we are not aware of works on the Integral Gram Decompo-
sition Problem, the rational version of this question arises as a natural mathe-
matical and algorithmic question for the representation of quadratic forms. For
example, Cassel [Cas] showed that a rational solution exists for m = n + 3; we
are unaware of an efficient algorithm to find such a solution. Lenstra [Len08]
proposed a polynomial time rational solution for m = 4n.
However, such rational solutions are not very satisfactory in our context, as
the denominators can get as large as the determinant of the input lattice. In fact,
if rational arithmetic with such large coefficient is deemed acceptable, then one
could directly use an implementation of Klein-GPV [Kle00, GPV08] algorithm
over the rationals.
Furthermore in [DP16], Ducas and Prest applied FFT techniques to improve
the Klein-GPV algorithm in the ring setting. Similarly, Genise and Micciancio
exploited the Schur complement and developed a discrete perturbation algorithm
in [GM18]. Yet in practice these methods still resort to floating-point arithmetic.
Roadmap. We start in Section 2 with some preliminary material. Section 3 shows
that rectangular Gram roots allow to sample according to the desired distribu-
tion. In Section 4, we introduce the Integral Gram Decomposition Problem and
detail the algorithms to solve it. We provide a detailed comparison with Peikert’s
perturbation sampler in Section 5. Finally we propose a variant of our integral
matrix decomposition geared to the ring setting in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
We use log and ln to denote respectively the base 2 logarithm and the natural
logarithm. Let  > 0 denote some very small number and ˆ =  + O(2). It is
easy to check that 1+1− = 1 + 2ˆ and ln
(
1+
1−
)
= 2ˆ.
For a distribution D over a countable set, we write z ←↩ D when the random
variable z is sampled from D, and denote by D(x) the probability of z = x.
For a real-valued function f and a countable set S, we write f(S) =
∑
x∈S f(x)
assuming that this sum is absolutely convergent (which is always the case in this
paper). Given two distributions D1 and D2 of common support E, the max-log
distance between D1 and D2 is
∆ML(D1, D2) = max
x∈E
| ln(D1(x))− ln(D2(x))|.
As shown in [MW17], it holds that∆ML(D1, D2) ≤ ∆ML(D1, D3)+∆ML(D2, D3).
2.2 Linear algebra
We use bold lower case letters to denote vectors, and bold upper case letters to
denote matrices. By convention, vectors are in column form. For a matrix A, we
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denote by Ai,j the element in the i-th row and j-th column, and by Ai:j,k:l the
sub-block (Aa,b)a∈{i,··· ,j},b∈{k,··· ,l}. Let bAe be the matrix obtained by rounding
each entry of A to the nearest integer. Let In be the n-dimensional identity
matrix.
For a square matrix Σ over R, let e1(Σ) be the largest eigenvalue of Σ.
Let ‖A‖2 = maxx6=0 ‖Ax‖‖x‖ =
√
e1(AtA) and ‖A‖F =
√∑
i,j A
2
i,j . It is known
that ‖At‖2 = ‖A‖2, ‖AB‖2 ≤ ‖A‖2‖B‖2 and ‖A‖2 ≤ ‖A‖F . We also write
‖A‖max = max |Ai,j | and ‖A‖col = maxj
√∑
i A
2
i,j .
Let Σ ∈ Rn×n be a symmetric matrix. We write Σ > 0 when Σ is positive
definite, i.e. xtΣx > 0 for all non-zero x ∈ Rn. It is known that Σ > 0 if and
only if Σ−1 > 0. We also write Σ1 > Σ2 when Σ1 − Σ2 > 0. It holds that
Σ1 > Σ2 > 0 if and only if Σ
−1
2 > Σ
−1
1 > 0. Similarly, we write Σ1 ≥ Σ2 or
Σ1−Σ2 ≥ 0 to state that Σ1−Σ2 is positive semi-definite. If Σ = AAt, we call
A a Gram root of Σ. In particular, if a Gram root A is a square and invertible
matrix, we call A a square Gram root5. When the context permits it, we denote√
Σ for any square Gram root of Σ. Let Σ1,Σ2 be positive definite matrices and
Σ = Σ1 + Σ2, then Σ > 0 and e1(Σ) ≤ e1(Σ1) + e1(Σ2).
2.3 Lattices
A lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of Rm, and is the set of all integer
linear combinations of linearly independent vectors b1, · · · ,bn ∈ Rm. We call
B =
(
b1 · · · bn
)
a basis and n the dimension of the lattice. If n = m, we call
the lattice full-rank. We denote by L(B) the lattice generated by the basis B.
Let L̂ = {u ∈ span(L) | ∀v ∈ L, 〈u,v〉 ∈ Z} be the dual lattice of L. For k ≤ n,
the k-th minimum λk(L) is the smallest value r ∈ R such that there are at least
k linearly independent vectors in L whose lengths are not greater than r.
Given A ∈ Zn×m with m ≥ n, we denote the orthogonal lattice6 defined by
A by Λ⊥(A) = {v ∈ Zm | Av = 0}. When the rank of A is n, the dimension of
Λ⊥(A) is (m− n).
2.4 Gaussians
Let ρR,c(x) = exp
(−pi(x− c)tR−tR−1(x− c)) be the n-dimensional Gaussian
weight with center c ∈ Rn and (scaled)7 covariance matrix Σ = RRt. Because
ρR,c(x) = exp
(−pi(x− c)tΣ−1(x− c)) is exactly determined by Σ, we also
write ρR,c as ρ√Σ,c. When c = 0, the Gaussian function is written as ρR or ρ√Σ
and is called centered. When Σ = s2In, we write the subscript
√
Σ as s directly,
and call s the width.
5 When n ≥ 2, any Σ > 0 has infinitely many square Gram roots.
6 Take note that we are here not considering the “q-ary orthogonal lattice” Λ⊥q (A) =
{v ∈ Zm | Av = 0 mod q}.
7 The scaling factor is 2pi and we omit it in this paper for convenience.
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The discrete Gaussian distribution over a lattice L with center c and covari-
ance matrix Σ is defined by the probability functionDL,√Σ,c(x) = ρ√Σ,c(x)/ρ√Σ,c(L)
for any x ∈ L. We recall some notions related to the smoothing parameter.
Definition 1 ([MR07], Definition 3.1). Given a lattice L and  > 0, the
smoothing parameter of L with respect to  is η(L) = min
{
s | ρ1/s
(
L̂
)
≤ 1 + 
}
.
Definition 2 ([Pei10], Definition 2.3). Given a full-rank lattice L,  > 0 and
a positive definite matrix Σ, we write
√
Σ ≥ η(L) if η
(√
Σ
−1 · L
)
≤ 1 i.e.
ρ√Σ−1
(
L̂
)
≤ 1 + .
We define η≤ (Zn) =
√
ln(2n(1 + 1/))/pi. We will use the following results
later.
Proposition 1. Given a lattice L and  > 0, then η(rL) = r·η(L) for arbitrary
r > 0.
Proposition 2. Let Σ1 ≥ Σ2 > 0 be two positive definite matrices. Let L be a
full-rank lattice and  ∈ (0, 1). If √Σ2 ≥ η(L), then
√
Σ1 ≥ η(L).
Proof. Notice that ρ√
Σ−11
(x) = exp(−pixtΣ1x) ≤ exp(−pixtΣ2x) = ρ√Σ−12 (x),
hence ρ√
Σ−11
(
L̂
)
≤ ρ√
Σ−12
(
L̂
)
. By Definition 2, we complete the proof. uunionsq
Lemma 1 ([MR07], Lemma 3.3). Let L be an n-dimensional lattice and  ∈
(0, 1). Then η(L) ≤ η≤ (Zn) · λn(L). In particular, for any ω(
√
log n) function,
there is a negligible  such that η(Zn) ≤ ω(
√
log n).
Lemma 2 ([MR07], implicit in Lemma 4.4). Let L be an n-dimensional
lattice and  ∈ (0, 1). If r ≥ η(L), then ρr(c + L) ∈ [ 1−1+ , 1]ρr(L) for any
c ∈ span(L).
We recall the convolution theorem with respect to discrete Gaussians that
was introduced in [Pei10].
Theorem 1 (Adapted from Theorem 3.1 [Pei10]). Let Σ1,Σ2 ∈ Rn×n
be positive definite matrices. Let Σ = Σ1 + Σ2 and let Σ3 ∈ Rn×n be such
that Σ−13 = Σ
−1
1 + Σ
−1
2 . Let L1,L2 be two full-rank lattices in Rn such that√
Σ1 ≥ η(L1) and
√
Σ3 ≥ η(L2) for  ∈ (0, 1/2). Let c1, c2 ∈ Rn. Then the
distribution of x1 ←↩ DL1,√Σ1,x2−c2+c1 where x2 ←↩ DL2,√Σ2,c2 is within max-
log distance 4ˆ of DL1,
√
Σ,c1
.
2.5 Integral decompositions
Lagrange’s four-square theorem states that every natural number can be repre-
sented as the sum of four integer squares. An efficient algorithm to find such a
decomposition was given by Rabin and Shallit [RS86].
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Theorem 2 (Rabin-Shallit algorithm [RS86]). There is a randomized algo-
rithm for expressing N ∈ N as a sum of four squares which requires an expected
number of O(log2N log logN) operations with integers smaller than N .
Another important integral decomposition for our work is the b-ary decompo-
sition, more conveniently formalized with the gadget vector g = (1, b, · · · , bk−1)t
in [MP12], hence called gadget decomposition. It says that for any n ∈ (−bk, bk)∩
Z, there exists a vector c ∈ Zk such that 〈c,g〉 = n and ‖c‖∞ < b. The
cost of such a decomposition is dominated by O(k) Euclidean divisions by b
that are particularly efficient in practice when b is a power of 2. Note that
‖g‖2 = (b2k − 1)/(b2 − 1).
3 Gaussian Sampling with An Integral Gram Root
In the Peikert’s sampler [Pei10], one samples perturbation vectors from a Gaus-
sian with certain covariance, say DZn,r
√
Σ during the offline phase. Among ex-
isting perturbation samplers [Pei10, MP12, GM18] this requires floating-point
arithmetic in the linear algebraic steps.
To avoid FPA, our starting point is the following observation: given an in-
tegral Gram root of Σ − In, one can sample from DZn,r√Σ without resorting
to FPA and in a quite simple manner. The main result of this section is the
following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Sampling theorem). Let Σ ∈ Zn×n such that Σ − In ≥ In.
Given A ∈ Zn×(n+m) such that AAt = Σ−In, A·Zn+m = Zn and λm(Λ⊥(A)) ≤
L, let D˜A(L
′, r) denote the distribution of DZn,r, 1
L′ ·c where c = Ax with x ←↩
DZn+m,L′r. For  ∈ (0, 1/2), r ≥ η(Zn) and L′ ≥ max{
√
2, (L/r) · η≤ (Zm)},
then
∆ML
(
D˜A(L
′, r), DZn,r√Σ
)
≤ 8ˆ.
To prove Theorem 3, we need the following linear transformation lemma for
discrete Gaussians.
Lemma 3 (Linear Transformation Lemma). Let A ∈ Zn×m such that A ·
Zm = Zn. Let Σ = AAt. For  ∈ (0, 1/2), if r ≥ η(Λ⊥(A)), then the max-log
distance between the distribution of y = Ax where x ←↩ DZm,r and DZn,r√Σ is
at most 4ˆ.
Remark 1. Lemma 3 generalizes the Theorem 3 of [MP13]. Indeed their theorem
corresponds to the case where column vectors of A are sampled from Gaussians.
Our proof follows similar steps.
Remark 2. Lemma 3 implies similar bounds for other metrics, such as the Kullback-
Leibler divergence [PDG14] and the Re´nyi divergence [BLL+15, Pre17].
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Proof. By assumption, both distributions have the same support Zn. Thus it suf-
fices to prove that the probability of y = y is (almost) proportional to ρr
√
Σ(y).
Given y = Ax, all integral solutions of x such that Ax = y form the coset
x + Λ⊥(A). Thus, for y = Ax, we have
Pr(y = y) ∝ ρr(x + Λ⊥(A)).
Let y′ = AtΣ−1y and x⊥ = x − y′, then y′ ∈ span(At) = {Atv | v ∈ Rn}
and Ax⊥ = Ax −AAtΣ−1y = 0, which implies that x⊥ ∈ span(Λ⊥(A)) and
x⊥ ⊥ span(At). Moreover, for any v ∈ Λ⊥(A), it can be verified that 〈y′,v〉 = 0.
It immediately follows that y′ ⊥ (x⊥ + Λ⊥(A)). Then, we have
ρr(x + Λ
⊥(A)) = ρr(y′ + x⊥ + Λ⊥(A))
= ρr(y
′) · ρr(x⊥ + Λ⊥(A))
= exp
(
− pi
r2
· y′ty′
)
· ρr(x⊥ + Λ⊥(A))
= exp
(
− pi
r2
· ytΣ−1y
)
· ρr(x⊥ + Λ⊥(A))
= ρr
√
Σ(y) · ρr(x⊥ + Λ⊥(A)).
Applying Lemma 2, it follows that
Pr(y = y) ∝ ρr√Σ(y) ·
[
1− 
1 + 
,
1 + 
1− 
]
.
By a routine computation, we complete the proof. uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 3. By Lemmata 3 and 1, the max-log distance between the
distribution of c = Ax and DZn,L′r
√
Σ−In is at most 4ˆ. By scaling, we have
that the max-log distance between the distribution of 1L′ · c and D 1L′ ·Zn,r√Σ−In
is still at most 4ˆ. It can be verified that
r
√(
(Σ− In)−1 + I−1n
)−1 ≥ η( 1
L′
· Zn
)
.
Combining Theorem 1, the proof follows. uunionsq
3.1 Reducing λm(Λ
⊥(A))
As shown in Theorem 3, with an integral Gram root, the sampling of DZn,r
√
Σ is
converted into two kinds of base samplings: DZ,L′r and DZ,r,c with c ∈ 1L′ ·Z. One
sometimes may prefer to work with small L′ whose size is mainly determined
by λm(Λ
⊥(A)). The following lemma suggests that given a matrix A, one can
construct an orthogonal lattice of relatively small successive minima by padding
A with some gadget matrices
(
In bIn · · · bk−1In
)
.
Lemma 4. Let A ∈ Zn×m with ‖A‖2 ≤ B. For b, k ∈ N such that bk > B, let
A′ =
(
In bIn · · · bk−1In A
)
, then λm+(k−1)n(Λ⊥ (A′)) ≤
√
nk(b− 1)2 + 1.
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Proof. Let G =
(
bIn · · · bk−1In
) ∈ Zn×(k−1)n. Since ‖A‖max ≤ ‖A‖2 ≤ B < bk,
by the gadget decomposition, we have A = C1 + GC2 where C1 ∈ Zn×m,
C2 ∈ Z(k−1)n×m and ‖Ci‖max < b for i = 1, 2.
Notice that P1 =
(
G A
−In(k−1)
−Im
)
contains (n(k − 1) +m) linearly indepen-
dent vectors of Λ⊥ (A′), then so does P2 = P1 ·
(
S⊗In −C2
Im
)
=
(
G·(S⊗In) C1
−S⊗In C2
−Im
)
,
where S =
 1 −b1 −b . . . −b
1
 ∈ Z(k−1)×(k−1). It can be verified that ‖P2‖col ≤√
nk(b− 1)2 + 1, which completes the proof. uunionsq
Remark 3. Lemma 4 provides a solution to reduce L′ at the cost of more base
samplings and some overhead on the final Gaussian width. In practice, it is
optional to pad gadget matrices considering the tradeoff. In later discussions, we
shall omit this trick and just focus on λm(Λ
⊥(A)).
4 Integral Gram Decompositions
In Section 3, we have explicated how to sample perturbation vectors using no
FPA with an integral Gram root. The computation of such an integral Gram
root is developed in this section. Let us first formally define the Integral Gram
Decomposition Problem.
Definition 3 (IGDPn,B,d,m). Let n,B, d,m ∈ N. The Integral Gram Decompo-
sition Problem, denoted by IGDPn,B,d,m, is defined as follows: given an integral
symmetric matrix Σ ∈ Zn×n with ‖Σ‖2 ≤ B, find an integral matrix A ∈ Zn×m
such that AAt = dIn −Σ.
Our final goal is to solve IGDPn,B,d,m with fixed (n,B) while keeping d =
(1 + o(1))B and m relatively small.
Our first approach (Section 4.1) only allows a decomposition of sufficiently
diagonally dominant matrices, i.e. d B, which implies a large overhead on the
final width of the Gaussian. Fortunately, when the parameter B is somewhat
large, say ω(n4), this can be fixed by first resorting to some integral approxima-
tions of Cholesky Gram roots and then working on the left-over matrix of small
norm. We call this procedure eigenvalue reduction and describe it in Section 4.2.
Finally, we combine these two algorithms and give several example instances in
Section 4.3.
4.1 Decomposition for diagonally dominant matrices
We present an algorithm to compute an integral Gram root of Σ′ = dIn−Σ for
a relatively large d. It is formally described in Algorithm 1.
The algorithm proceeds by induction, reducing IGDPn,B,d,m to IGDPn−1,B′,d,m′
where B′ and m′ are slightly larger than B and m respectively. To do so, one first
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constructs T ∈ Zn×k such that TTt and Σ′ have the same first row and column,
and then proceeds iteratively over (Σ′ −TTt)2:n,2:n. In the construction of T,
to clear out the off-diagonal elements, we make use of a gadget decomposition
〈ci,g〉 = Σ′1,i (i > 1). The remaining diagonal element, namely Σ′1,1 − ‖g‖2, is
then handled by the 4-square theorem.
To ensure the inductive construction goes through, Algorithm 1 requires a
certain strongly positive definiteness condition. Obviously, we need that d −
Σi,i ≥ ‖g‖2, but we also need to account for the perturbation TTt subtracted
from Σ′ during the induction. The correctness and efficiency of this algorithm
is given in Lemma 5.
Algorithm 1: Integral matrix decomposition for a strongly diagonally
dominant matrix DiagDomIGD(Σ, d, b, k)
Input: a symmetric matrix Σ ∈ Zn×n,
two integers b, k ≥ 2 such that bk ≥ ‖Σ‖max + k(n− 1)b2,
an integer d such that d ≥ b2k−1
b2−1 + b
k.
Output: A =
(
L1 · · · Lk D1 · · · D4
) ∈ Zn×n(k+4) such that AAt = dIn −Σ
where Li ∈ Zn×n is a lower-triangular matrix whose diagonal elements are bi−1
and Di ∈ Zn×n is a diagonal matrix.
1: g← (1, b, · · · , bk−1)t
2: calculate x = (x1, x2, x3, x4)
t ∈ Z4 such that ‖x‖2 = d−Σ1,1 − ‖g‖2 using
Rabin-Shallit algorithm (Theorem 2)
3: if n = 1 then
4: return (gt,xt)
5: end if
6: for j = 2, · · · , n do
7: calculate cj ∈ Zk such that 〈cj ,g〉 = −Σ1,j by gadget decomposition
8: end for
9: C← (c2 · · · cn )t ∈ Z(n−1)×k, T← (gt xtC
)
∈ Zn×(4+k)
10: Π← (Σ + TTt)
2:n,2:n
11:
(
L′1 · · · L′k D′1 · · · D′4
)← DiagDomIGD(Π, d, b, k) {Recursive call}
12:
(
v′1 · · · v′k
)← C
13: Li ←
(
bi−1
v′i L
′
i
)
∈ Zn×n for i = 1, · · · , k
14: Di ←
(
xi
D′i
)
∈ Zn×n for i = 1, · · · , 4
15: return A =
(
L1 · · · Lk D1 · · · D4
)
Remark 4. For tighter parameters, we consider ‖Σ‖max instead of direct ‖Σ‖2
in Algorithm 1, which does not affect the main result, i.e. Corollary 1.
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Lemma 5. Algorithm 1 is correct. More precisely, let Σ ∈ Zn×n be symmetric
and d, b, k ∈ Z such that bk ≥ ‖Σ‖max + k(n − 1)b2 and d ≥ b2k−1b2−1 + bk. Then
DiagDomIGD(Σ, d, b, k) outputs A ∈ Zn×n(k+4) such that AAt = dIn −Σ.
Moreover, DiagDomIGD(Σ, d, b, k) performs O(kn3+n log2 d log log d) arithme-
tic operations on integers of bitsize O(log d).
Proof. There are n calls to the Rabin-Shallit algorithm in Algorithm 1, and all
input integers are at most 2d. Thus the total cost of the Rabin-Shallit algo-
rithm is O(n log2 d log log d) operations on integers of bitsize O(log d). There are
also n(n−1)2 gadget decompositions, and the total cost is O(n
2k) operations on
integers of bitsize at most k log b ≤ log d. For matrix multiplication, we follow
the textbook algorithm, thus the total cost is O(n3k) operations on integers of
bitsize at most O(log d). This yields the overall running time complexity.
We now prove the correctness. Since d − Σ1,1 ≥ d − ‖Σ‖max ≥ ‖g‖2, the
existence of a 4-square decomposition x is ensured. For Σ1,j with j > 1, we have
|Σ1,j | ≤ ‖Σ‖max < bk, which implies the existence of cj and ‖cj‖∞ < b. Then
it can be verified that
dIn −Σ−TTt =
(
0 0t
0 Π′
)
where Π′ = dIn−1 −Π ∈ Z(n−1)×(n−1) and Π = Σ2:n,2:n + Ξ with Ξ = CCt.
Notice that ‖cj‖ ≤ b
√
k, hence ‖Π‖max ≤ ‖Σ‖max + kb2. Further we have that
bk ≥ ‖Π‖max + k(n− 2)b2 and d ≥ b
2k − 1
b2 − 1 + b
k.
So far, all parameter conditions indeed hold for d and Π correspondingly. The-
refore, the induction goes through and Algorithm 1 is correct. uunionsq
Notice that ‖Σ‖max ≤ ‖Σ‖2, we immediately get the following result.
Corollary 1. Let n,B, d, b, k ∈ N such that bk ≥ B+k(n−1)b2 and d ≥ b2k−1b2−1 +
bk. Then there exists a solution to IGDPn,B,d,n(k+4) and it can be calculated by
Algorithm 1.
To use such a decomposition for perturbation sampling, we also need to
control λm−n(Λ⊥(A)). Lemma 6 shows that this can easily be done by padding
the output A with an identity matrix In.
Lemma 6. Let A = DiagDomIGD(Σ, d, b, k) ∈ Zn×m where m = n(k + 4). Let
A′ =
(
In A
)
, then A′ · Zn+m = Zn, the dimension of Λ⊥(A′) is m, and
λm(Λ
⊥(A′)) ≤ max
b2√n,
√
d− b
2k − 1
b2 − 1 + ‖Σ‖max
 .
12
Proof. Let S =
 1 −b1 −b . . . −b
1
 ∈ Z(k−1)×(k−1).We define D = (D1 · · · D4 ) ∈
Zn×4n,L =
(
L1 · · · Lk
) ∈ Zn×kn such that A′ = (L D ). We also define
L = L · (S ⊗ In) =
(
L1 L2 − bL1 · · · Lk − bLk−1
)
, then ‖L‖max < b2 and the
diagonal elements of Li − bLi−1 are 0. Let
P =
(
A′
−Im
)
·
(
S⊗ In
I4n
)
=
 L D−S⊗ In
−I4n
 ,
then P contains m linearly independent vectors of Λ⊥(A′). A straightforward
computation yields that
‖P‖col ≤ max
b2√n,
√
d− b
2k − 1
b2 − 1 + ‖Σ‖max
 ,
which implies the conclusion immediately. uunionsq
4.2 Eigenvalue reduction
The parameter requirements of Corollary 1 are rather demanding. Indeed, the
minimal d is at least B + b2k−2 + k(n − 1)b2 > 2B√k(n− 1), which results in
costly overhead on the final Gaussian width, and therefore on all the parameters
of the cryptosystem. Yet we claim that for some large B, say ω(n4), one can
overcome this issue with the help of some integral approximations of Cholesky
decompositions. The case of large B is of interest in advanced lattice based
schemes [ABB10, CHKP10, GVW13]. Note that by scaling, this constraint on
B can even be removed if one accepts to include a few (O(log n)) rational bits
in the Gram decomposition.
This technique essentially can be summarized as a reduction from IGDPn,B,d,m
to IGDPn,B′,d−B,m−n in which B′  B. One first splits dIn −Σ into two parts:
Σ′ = B · In −Σ and (d−B) · In. Exploiting an integral approximation of Cho-
lesky decomposition, one decomposes Σ′ as a Gram matrix LLt and a small
matrix Σ′′. Then it suffices to decompose (d − B)In + Σ′′, which implies the
reduction. As B′  B, the overhead introduced by IGDPn,B′,d−B,m−n can be
negligible compared with the original B. The formal description is illustrated in
Algorithm 2, and an upper bound of B′ is shown in Lemma 7.
For better description, we define a function Fn : N→ N specified by n as
Fn(x) =
⌈√
n(n+ 1)x+
n(n+ 1)
8
⌉
.
Lemma 7. Let Σ ∈ Zn×n be a symmetric matrix and B ≥ ‖Σ‖2. Let (L,Π) =
EigenRed(Σ, B), then ‖Π‖2 ≤ Fn(B).
13
Algorithm 2: Eigenvalue reduction EigenRed(Σ, B)
Input: a symmetric matrix Σ ∈ Zn×n with ‖Σ‖2 ≤ B.
Output: (L,Π) where L ∈ Zn×n, Π ∈ Zn×n is symmetric and
B · In −Σ = LLt −Π.
1: L←
⌊
L˜
⌉
where L˜ is the Cholesky Gram root of B · In −Σ
2: Π← LLt − (B · In −Σ)
3: return (L,Π)
Proof. Let ∆ = L − L˜, then ‖∆‖max ≤ 12 and ∆ is lower triangular. We have
‖∆‖2 ≤ ‖∆‖F ≤ 12 ·
√
n(n+1)
2 and ‖L˜‖2 ≤
√
2B, then
‖Π‖2 = ‖∆L˜t + L˜∆t + ∆∆t‖2 ≤ 2‖L˜‖2‖∆‖2 + ‖∆‖22 ≤ Fn(B).
We complete the proof. uunionsq
Corollary 2. Let n,B, d,m ∈ N. There is a deterministic reduction from IGDPn,B,d,m
to IGDPn,Fn(B),d−B,m−n whose cost is dominated by one call to Cholesky decom-
position on some positive semi-definite matrix Σ ∈ Zn×n with ‖Σ‖2 ≤ 2B.
Remark 5. One may fear the re-introduction of Cholesky within our algorithm,
however we argue that it is in this context much less of an issue:
– costly FPA computation may still be needed, but they are now confined to
a one-time pre-computation, rather than a many-time off-line phase,
– the weak determinism of this FPA computation can be mitigated by running
pre-computation as part of the trapdoor generation algorithm, and providing
the pre-computed integral Gram decomposition as part of the secret key,
– the eigenvalue reduction algorithm can tolerate a rather crude approximation
of Cholesky without leading to a hard to detect statistical leak. At worse,
insufficient precision will simply fail to solve the IGDP instance at hand.
That is, only completeness is at stake, not security, and one may tolerate
rare failures.
– one may also completely avoid FPA by resorting to potentially less efficient
though more convenient square root approximation algorithm. In particular,
we note that the Taylor series of
√
1− x involves only power-of-2 denomina-
tors: one can design a “strongly deterministic” algorithm.
4.3 Putting them together
So far, we have introduced two algorithmic tools for IGDPn,B,d,m: the integral
decomposition for diagonally dominant matrices DiagDomIGD(Σ, d, b, k) and the
eigenvalue reduction EigenRed(Σ, B). They can be combined as follows: one first
applies the eigenvalue reduction iteratively and then decomposes the final left-
over matrix. We summarize this as IGD(Σ, d, B, t, b, k) in Algorithm 3, and prove
its correctness in Lemma 8.
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We follow the notation Fn given in Section 4.2, and also define its iterated
function F
(i)
n : N→ N for i ∈ N by: F (0)n (x) = x and F (i+1)n (x) = Fn
(
F
(i)
n (x)
)
.
Algorithm 3: Integral matrix decomposition IGD(Σ, d, B, t, b, k)
Input: a symmetric matrix Σ ∈ Zn×n with ‖Σ‖2 ≤ B,
non-negative integers b, k, t such that bk ≥ F (t)n (B) + k(n− 1)b2,
an integer d such that d ≥ b2k−1
b2−1 + b
k +
∑t−1
i=0 F
(i)
n (B).
Output: A =
(
A1 A2
) ∈ Zn×(m1+m2) such that AAt = dIn −Σ where
m1 = nt and m2 = n(k + 4),
A1 ∈ Zn×m1 consists of t lower-triangular matrices,
A2 = DiagDomIGD(Π, d−∑t−1i=0 F (i)n (B), b, k) ∈ Zn×m2 where ‖Π‖2 ≤ F (t)n (B).
1: A1 ← () (an empty matrix ∈ Zn×0·n), Π← Σ
2: for i = 1, · · · , t do
3: (L,Π)← EigenRed(Π, F (i−1)n (B))
4: A1 ←
(
A1 L
)
5: end for
6: A2 ← DiagDomIGD(Π, d−∑t−1i=0 F (i)n (B), b, k) ∈ Zn×m2
7: return
(
A1 A2
)
Lemma 8. Algorithm 3 is correct. More precisely, let Σ ∈ Zn×n be symmetric
and d,B, t, b, k ∈ N such that ‖Σ‖2 ≤ B, bk ≥ F (t)n (B) + k(n − 1)b2 and d ≥
b2k−1
b2−1 + b
k +
∑t−1
i=0 F
(i)
n (B). Then IGD(Σ, d, B, t, b, k) outputs A ∈ Zn×m such
that AAt = dIn −Σ and m = n(t+ k + 4).
Remark 6. In practice, the calculation of the Gram root A can be accomplished
during the key generation and needs to run only once. Therefore, we do not take
into account the complexity of IGD(Σ, d, B, t, b, k).
Proof. It can be verified that
A1A
t
1 =
(
t−1∑
i=0
F (i)n (B)
)
· In −Σ + Π
and
A2A
t
2 =
(
d−
t−1∑
i=0
F (i)n (B)
)
· In −Π,
hence AAt = dIn−Σ. According to Lemmata 5 and 7, all conditions required by
the calls of EigenRed(Π, F
(i−1)
n (B)) and DiagDomIGD(Π, d−∑t−1i=0 F (i)n (B), b, k)
are satisfied. Therefore, Algorithm 3 is correct. uunionsq
Now we give an upper bound of λm−n(Λ⊥(A)) in Lemma 9. Similar to
Lemma 6, we also pad the Gram root A with In.
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Lemma 9. Let A = IGD(Σ, d, B, t, b, k) ∈ Zn×m where m = n(t + k + 4). Let
A′ =
(
In A
)
, then A′ · Zn+m = Zn, the dimension of Λ⊥(A′) is m, and
λm(Λ
⊥(A′)) ≤ max
b2√n,
√√√√d+ F (t)n (B)− b2k − 1
b2 − 1 −
t−1∑
i=0
F
(i)
n (B), max
0≤i<t
√
2F
(i)
n (B) + n
 .
Proof. Let A =
(
A1 A2
)
where A1 ∈ Zn×m1 with m1 = nt and A2 ∈ Zn×m2
with m2 = n(k + 4). Let A
′
1 =
(
In A1
)
and A′2 =
(
In A2
)
, then
λm(Λ
⊥(A′)) ≤ max{λm1(Λ⊥(A′1)), λm2(Λ⊥(A′2))}.
The matrix A1 consists of t lower-triangular matrices, denoted by L1, · · · ,Lt,
such that Li =
⌊
L˜i
⌉
and ‖L˜i‖col ≤ ‖L˜i‖2 ≤
√
2F
(i−1)
n (B) by Lemma 7. It follows
that ‖Li‖col ≤ ‖L˜i‖col +
√
n
2 ≤
√
2F
(i−1)
n (B) +
√
n
2 , and then we have
λm1(Λ
⊥(A′1)) ≤ max
1≤i≤t
√
‖Li‖2col + 1 ≤ max
0≤i<t
√
2F
(i)
n (B) + n.
As for λm2(Λ
⊥(A′2)), combining Lemmata 6 and 7 leads to that
λm2(Λ
⊥(A′2)) ≤ max
b2√n,
√√√√d+ F (t)n (B)− b2k − 1
b2 − 1 −
t−1∑
i=0
F
(i)
n (B)
 .
The proof is completed. uunionsq
As the parameters n and B have been determined before the key generation,
one can first choose suitable (t, b, k) and then proceed to minimize d satisfying
the requirements of Algorithm 3. We next discuss concrete parameter selections
according to the size of B.
Case 1: B = ω(n6). In this case, we insist on a common gadget setting: b = 2.
One can first fix (t, b) = (2, 2) and then choose k = 1 +
⌈
3
2 log(n+ 1) +
1
4 logB
⌉
.
The minimal d is bounded by B + 2(n+ 1)3
√
B = (1 + o(1))B.
Under this setting, the final integral Gram root A′ =
(
In A
)
is of size
n× (n+m) with m = n(k + 6), and λm(Λ⊥(A′)) ≤
√
2B + n for d ≤ 3B.
Case 2: B = ω(n4). We now insist on minimizing the total size of the output A.
To this end, one first sets (t, k) = (1, 3) and then selects b =
⌈
3n+
√
2n
1
3B
1
6
⌉
.
The minimal d is bounded by B + 2b4 = (1 + o(1))B.
Under this setting, the final integral Gram root A′ =
(
In A
)
is of size
n×(n+m) with m = 8n, and λm(Λ⊥(A′)) ≤ max{
√
2B+n, b2
√
n = O(n
7
6B
1
3 )}
for d ≤ 3B.
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Case 3: B = O(n4). In some scenarios,B can be relatively small, say O˜(n) [MP12,
BFRLS18], so that the current algorithm does not work directly. But we can
still compute an almost integral Gram root of dIn −Σ. By almost integral, we
mean that we resort to rationals of the form i/2ν , with only a few rational bits
ν = O(log n).
The trick is rather simple: by scaling both d and B by a factor of 22ν , one
can reduce the case of small B to the case of a large one. This technique indeed
applies for any B and d > B + 1, when the scaling factor is sufficiently large.
As an example, we choose arbitrary ν ∈ Z such that 22νB = ω(n4). As
shown in Case 2, selecting (t, k, b) =
(
1, 3,
⌈
3n+
√
2n
1
3 (22νB)
1
6
⌉)
allows an
almost integral decomposition, and the minimal d is bounded by B+2b4 ·2−2ν =
(1 + o(1))B.
Under this setting, the final integral Gram root A′ = 2−ν · ( In A ) is of size
n× (n+m) with m = 8n. A minor modification to apply Theorem 3 is that one
should consider λm(Λ
⊥(2ν ·A′)) to fulfil Lemma 3. This can be done similarly:
λm(Λ
⊥(2ν ·A′)) ≤ max{2ν√2B + n, b2√n = O(2 23νn 76B 13 )} for d ≤ 3B.
We compare above parameter selections according to some values including:
(1) m = m + n, determining the size of the Gram root; (2) L, an upper bound
of λm(Λ
⊥(A′)) dominating L′ in Theorem 3; and (3) dmin, the minimum of d
proportional to the minimal final width. We summarize three cases in Table 1.
m = m+ n L dmin
Gadget base b = 2:
B = ω(n6)
O(n logB) O
(√
B
)
(1 + o(1))B
Large gadget base:
B = ω(n4)
9n O
(√
B + n
7
6B
1
3
)
(1 + o(1))B
Almost integral:
B = O(n4)
9n O
(
2ν
√
B + 2
2
3
νn
7
6B
1
3
)
(1 + o(1))B
Table 1. Parameter selections of the integral Gram decomposition. In the first two
cases, the final Gram root A′ is integral of size n×m. In the third one, the final Gram
root is 2−νA′ where A′ ∈ Zn×m and ν = 2 logn− 1
2
logB + ω(1) is an integer.
5 Comparisons with Peikert’s Perturbation Sampler
Throughout this section, Σ ∈ Zn×n is a positive semi-definite matrix, and s = rs′
is the final Gaussian width where r is the base sampling parameter and s′2 ∈ Z
such that s′2 ≥ e1(Σ)+1. The covariance of perturbation vectors is r2(s′2In−Σ).
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The later discussions specialize to e1(Σ) = ω(n
6), which can occur in advanced
cryptosystems, e.g. hierarchical IBE [ABB10, CHKP10] and ABE [GVW13].8
Applying the integral matrix decomposition from Section 4 along with The-
orem 3, we devise a variant of Peikert’s perturbation sampling algorithm. This
variant requires no floating-point arithmetic, and the intermediate matrix is inte-
gral. The centers of the base Gaussian samplings are integers scaled by a common
factor L′, which is easier to deal with. Moreover, our approach only enlarges the
final width by a factor of 1 + o(1).
We next compare our sampler with the Peikert’s one [Pei10] from the fol-
lowing aspects: the storage of the Gram root (Section 5.1), required base sam-
plings (Section 5.2) and the quality of final Gaussians (Section 5.3). Additio-
nally, we discuss the applications within the Micciancio-Peikert trapdoor fra-
mework [MP12] in Section 5.4, and show that exploiting the trapdoor, one can
significantly reduce the size of the matrix to be decomposed.
5.1 Required storage
In the Peikert’s sampler, the precomputation is a standard (real) Cholesky Gram
root of
√
(s′2 − 1)In −Σ and it requires n(n+1)2 (log s′+λ) bits of storage, where
λ is a security parameter that is usually set to O(n).
In our sampler, the intermediate matrix is A =
(
In A1 A2
) ∈ Zn+m where(
A1 A2
)
= IGD(Σ, s′2 − 2, B, t, b, k) ∈ Zn×m and m = n(t + k + 4). The
sub-matrix A1 consists of t lower-triangular matrices, and its storage is about
n(n+1)
2
(∑t−1
i=0 log
√
F
(i)
n (B)
)
bits. The parameter t can be very small, say t =
1, 2 (see Section 4.3), and {F (i)n (B)}i decreases very fast at the beginning for
large B. Therefore, the actual storage of A1 is well bounded. As for A2, while
it is even wider, namely n × n(k + 4), its regular structure allows an efficient
storage. More precisely, treating (b, k) as global variables, it suffices to store
off-diagonal entries that are in (−b, b) in the first k blocks and diagonal ones
in the rest blocks (see Algorithm 1). Thus the storage of A2 is bounded by
n(n−1)
2 k log b + 2n log(s
′), which is about n(n−1)2 log(F
(t)
n (B)) + 2n log(s′) when
bk = O(F
(t)
n (B)).
We summarize in Table 2 the storage comparison. Despite the integral Gram
root A being wider, it can achieve asymptotically better storage efficiency than
the FPA solution. In fact, the storage is still an advantage even we apply the
almost integral decomposition in Section 4.3 to deal with small e1(Σ).
5.2 Base samplings
To generate an integral perturbation, one first samples from a Gaussian of co-
variance r2((s′2 − 1)In − Σ). In the Peikert’s sampler, this is accomplished by
continuous Gaussian sampling with high precision, which is expensive. In our
8 When e1(Σ) is small, one can resort to the almost integral Gram root in Section 4.3.
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Storage of Gram root
Peikert’s sampler ≈ n2
2
(log s′ + λ) where λ is the security
parameter
Ours ≈ n2
4
(∑t
i=0 log(F
(i)
n (s
′2)) + log(F (t)n (s′2))
)
Ours with t = 1 ≈ n2(log s′ + 1
2
logn)
Ours with t = 2 ≈ n2(log s′ + logn)
Table 2. The storage comparison. The concrete parameter selections of t = 1, 2 are
discussed in Section 4.3.
sampler, this is accomplished by sampling from DZn+m,L′r and then multiplying
a scaled integral Gram root, i.e. 1L′A.
There are also some non-centered samplings. The Peikert’s algorithm requires
to sample from DZ,r,c with a floating-point center. In our sampler, all Gaussian
centers are in 1L′ · Z with some L′ ≥ λm(Λ⊥(A)).
We exhibit the comparison on the base samplings in Table 3. As shown in
Section 4.3, we may choose some L′ = O(s′+n
7
6 s′
2
3 ). When the padding trick is
used (see Section 3.1), L′ can be even smaller, namely O
(√
n log s′
)
. In concrete
implementations, we would suggest to set L′ to be a power-of-2 so that with
a minor modification, all samplings can be done by only two base samplers
DZ,r and DZ,r,1/2 as in [MW17]. Therefore, the base samplings required by us
are easier to implement than that by Peikert. While our sampler requires more
centered samples, (n+m) is O(n log s′) even O(n), which does not increase the
base sample number too much.
Centered samplings Non-centered samplings
Peikert’s sampler
DR,r
n times
DZ,r,c with c ∈ R
n times
Ours
DZ,L′r
O(n) times
DZ,r,c with c ∈ 1L′ · Z
n times
Ours with padding
(Section 3.1)
DZ,L′r
O(n log s′) times
DZ,r,c with c ∈ 1L′ · Z
n times
Table 3. The base sampling comparison. Here DR,r denotes the continuous Gaussian
over R of width r. In our sampler, the Gram root A ∈ Zn×(n+m). If no padding,
m = O(n) (say 8n) and L′ = O(s′ + n
7
6 s′
2
3 ) ≥ λm(Λ⊥(A)). If padding is used, m =
O(n log s′) and L′ = O(
√
n log s′).
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5.3 The quality of final Gaussians
In Peikert’s sampler, r ≥ η(Zn) and s′2 ≥ e1(Σ) + 1 so that the minimal s
is η(Zn)
√
e1(Σ) + 1. Our sampler also applies to any r ≥ η(Zn) according to
Theorem 3. As for s′, its minimum is (1 + o(1))
√
e1(Σ) (see Section 4.3). Thus
the minimal s achieved by us is (1 + o(1)) · η(Zn)
√
e1(Σ). As a conclusion, our
sampler only leads to a very small loss in the quality of final Gaussians.
5.4 The case of the Micciancio-Peikert trapdoor
In [MP12], Micciancio and Peikert propose a celebrated trapdoor framework
which has been the basis of various primitives [GVW13, DM14, BFRLS18]. In
this framework, the matrix Σ =
(
T
I
)(
Tt I
)
where T ∈ Zn1×n2 is the trapdoor
with n1  n1+n2. The Gaussian sampling is performed by an entity that knows
the trapdoor T.
We now explain how to use the trapdoor to reduce the input size at the
beginning of the matrix decomposition of Σ′ = dIn −Σ (a similar idea is used
in [GM18]). More precisely, notice that
Σ′ = dIn −Σ =
(
dIn1 − 2TTt
(d− 2)In2
)
+
(
T
−I
)(
Tt −I ) .
Hence, it suffices to decompose Σ′new = dIn1 − 2TTt whose dimension is n1,
which is much less than n = n1+n2.
9 This trick needs neither extra computation
nor storage, and only enlarges the maximal elements in Σnew(= 2TT
t) by a
factor of 2. Therefore we suggest to use this trick as the preprocessing of the
integral decomposition in the Micciancio-Peikert trapdoor framework.10
6 The Ring Setting
The algorithms in Section 4 target general positive definite matrices, however
the decompositions break the structure in the ring setting. This defeats the
purpose of using rings in the first place. In this section, we propose an integral
decomposition algorithm for the ring setting that exploits the inductive ring
structure as in [DP16]. For simplicity we only discuss the case of power-of-2
cyclotomic rings, i.e. R2w = Z[x]/(xw + 1) with w = 2`, but similar to [DP16]
the results can be extended to more general cyclotomic rings and convolution
rings whose conductor is a product of small primes.
In the following section, we first recall some preliminaries on cyclotomic rings
(Section 6.1). Next by exploiting the tower of rings structure, we propose a de-
composition for some positive definite polynomials (Section 6.2). This can be
viewed as the counterpart of 4-square decomposition for ring elements. With the
9 The other block can be addressed by 4-square decomposition directly.
10 Note that this requires some new analysis of smoothness conditions.
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decomposition of a single polynomial, we adapt Algorithm 1 to the ring setting
(Section 6.3). Compared with the generic solution (Section 4), the ring-based
integral decomposition saves the storage by a factor of O(w) at the cost of incre-
asing the column number of the integral Gram root by O(logw) (Section 6.4).
6.1 Preliminaries on Cyclotomic rings
Let w ∈ N and let Φw(x) ∈ Z[x] be the w-th cyclotomic polynomial. The w-th
cyclotomic ring is Rw = Z[x]/(Φw(x)) and the w-th cyclotomic field is Kw =
Q[x]/(Φw(x)). In this paper, we only discuss the case of power-of-2 cyclotomic
rings where w = 2` and Φ2w(x) = x
w + 1. For such kind of rings, we have the
following tower of rings:
R2w ⊇ Rw ⊇ · · · ⊇ R2 = Z. (1)
Adjoints. Let Φ ∈ R[x] be monic with distinct roots over C, and f, g ∈
R[x]/(Φ(x)). We denote by f? the (Hermitian) adjoint of f , that is, the unique
element of R[x]/(Φ(x)) such that f?(ξ) = f(ξ) for any root ξ of Φ. This gene-
ralizes the complex conjugation of real numbers. We say that f is self-adjoint if
f = f?. It is easy to verify that ff? is self-adjoint and all self-adjoint elements
form a ring. When Φ is a cyclotomic polynomial, it holds that f?(x) = f(x−1).
Norms and gadgets. For f =
∑w−1
i=0 fix
i ∈ K2w, let ‖f‖ =
√∑w−1
i=0 |fi|2 be
its `2-norm, and ‖f‖∞ = maxi |fi| be its `∞-norm. For f = (f0, · · · , fn−1)t and
g = (g0, · · · , gn−1)t in Kn2w, let ‖f‖ =
√∑n−1
i=0 ‖fi‖2, ‖f‖∞ = maxi ‖fi‖∞ and
〈f ,g〉 = ∑i fig?i ∈ K2w. For Σ ∈ Kn×n2w , let ‖Σ‖2 = maxx6=0 ‖Σx‖‖x‖ and ‖Σ‖max =
maxi,j ‖Σi,j‖∞. Moreover, the gadget decomposition generalizes naturally: given
the gadget vector g = (1, b, · · · , bk−1)t ∈ Rk2w, for any f ∈ R2w with ‖f‖∞ < bk,
there exists c ∈ Rk2w such that 〈c,g〉 = f and ‖c‖∞ < b, and it can be efficiently
computed.
Even and odd polynomials. Each f ∈ R2w can be uniquely written as:
f(x) = fe(x
2) + xfo(x
2),
where fe, fo are elements of the subring Rw ⊂ R2w. We say that fe (resp. fo) is
the even (resp. odd) part of f , and indeed it consists of the even-index (resp. odd-
index) coefficients of f , respectively. We also say that a polynomial is even (resp.
odd) if its odd (resp. even) part is zero. Any even polynomial of Z[x]/(xw + 1)
can be seen as an element of Z[y]/(yw/2 + 1) by the ring morphism y → x2.
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Ring gadgets. A key step of our algorithms in the ring setting consists of
projecting a self-adjoint polynomial f ∈ R2w onto the subring Rw. More pre-
cisely, we exhibit a polynomial a ∈ R2w such that aa? + f is even (hence is in
R2w) and self-ajoint. Let us write fe(x2) + xfo(x2); since f is self-adjoint, it
holds that fi = −fw−i for each coefficient fi of f , and we can therefore write
xfo(x
2) = xf¯o(x
2) + (xf¯o(x
2))? for some polynomial f¯o ∈ Rw with only its
lower-half coefficients nonzero. Taking a = 1− xf¯o(x2), we have:
f + aa? = fe(x
2) + xf¯o(x
2) + (xf¯o(x
2))? + (1− xf¯o(x2))(1− xf¯o(x2))?
= fe(x
2) + f¯o(x
2)(f¯o(x
2))? + 1
All the odd terms have been eliminated, and f+aa? is isomorphic to an element
of Rw. As an example, let us consider the following self-adjoint element of R16:
f = 32− 8x+ 2x2 − 9x3 + 9x5 − 2x6 + 8x7,
f = (32 + 2x2 − 2x6) + x(−8− 9x2) + (x(−8− 9x2))?.
Then we will take: a = 1− xf¯o(x2) = 1 + 8x+ 9x3. One can check that:
f + aa? = −74x6 + 74x2 + 178,
which is indeed in the subring R8. This projection is compatible with the use
of gadget matrices; more precisely, we can first decompose a polynomial using
gadget decomposition, and then apply the projection to each element of the
decomposition. Finally we have f +
∑k
i=1 aia
?
i is even, where ai = b
i−1 +xci(x2)
and
∑k
i=1 b
i−1ci = −f¯o. We will refer to these combined decomposition and
projection as ring gadgets.
6.2 Decomposition for ring elements
The new notations we introduced allow us to generalize the IGDP problem to
the ring setting by introducing a new parameter; the ring R. More precisely,
IGDPR,n,B,d,m, is defined as follows: given a symmetric matrix Σ ∈ Rn×n with
‖Σ‖2 ≤ B, find a matrix A ∈ Rn×m such that AAt = dIn−Σ. If R is omitted,
then it is assumed that R = Z and we fall back on the initial definition of
IGDPn,B,d,m (Definition 3).
We proceed to generalize 4-square decomposition to the ring setting. Preci-
sely, our goal is to represent one integral self-adjoint ring element f ∈ R2w as
〈a,a〉 where a ∈ Rm2w is an integral polynomial vector. Equivalently, we seek to
solve the special case IGDPR2w,1,B,d,m.
Our solution is build upon the use of ring gadgets, defined at the end of
Section 6.1. As previously illustrated, a single application of a ring gadget can
be viewed as the reduction IGDPR2w,1,B,d,m → IGDPRw,1,B′,d′,m′ . Hence, we have
projected our problem onto a subring.
We can go further. As recalled in (1), the Ri’s are arranged in a tower of rings
structure, thus we can repeatedly apply ring gadgets to project IGDPR,1,B,d,m
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onto a subring, until it is projected in R4. We note that the set of all self-adjoint
elements of R4 is exactly Z and thus IGDPR4,1,B,B,4 is easily solved via the
Rabin-Shallit algorithm. We have this chain of reductions:
IGDPR2w,1,B,d,m → IGDPRw,1,B′,d′,m′ → · · · → IGDPR4,1,B′′,d′′,m′′
We formally describe the procedure in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Decomposition of a single ring element REIGD(d, f, b, k)
Input: a self-adjoint f ∈ R2w with w = 2` ≥ 2,
two integers b, k ≥ 2 such that bk ≥ ‖f‖∞ + kwb2,
an integer d such that d ≥ b2k−1
b2−1 (`− 1) + bk.
Output: A vector a =
(
a1 · · · ak(`−1) x1 x2 x3 x4
) ∈ Rk(`−1)+4w such that
〈a,a〉 = d− f , where x1, x2, x3, x4 ∈ Z, ai ∈ Rw, and the element a1+jk+i is of
the form a1+jk+i = b
i + a′i,j
(
x2
`−2−j)
, with a′i,j ∈ R2j+2 for any 0 ≤ i < k and
0 ≤ j < `− 1.
1: g← (1, b, · · · , bk−1)t
2: if w = 2 then
3: calculate x = (x1, x2, x3, x4)
t ∈ Z4 such that ‖x‖2 = d− f using the
Rabin-Shallit algorithm (Theorem 2)
4: return x
5: end if
6: calculate
(
a1 · · · ak
) ∈ Rkw by using ring gadgets such that f +∑i aia?i is even
7: let f ′ ∈ Rw such that f ′(x2) = f − b2k−1b2−1 +
∑
i aia
?
i
8: a′ =
(
a′1 · · · a′k(`−2) x1 x2 x3 x4
)← REIGD(d− b2k−1
b2−1 , f
′, b, k
)
9: return a =
(
a′1(x
2) · · · a′k(`−2)(x2) ‖ a1 · · · ak ‖ x1 x2 x3 x4
) ∈ Rk(`−1)+4w
Lemma 10 shows the correctness and the complexity analysis of Algorithm 4.
Lemma 10. Algorithm 4 is correct. More precisely, let w = 2` ≥ 2 and f ∈ R2w
be a self-adjoint polynomial, let d, b, k ∈ Z such that bk ≥ ‖f‖∞ + kwb2 and
d ≥ b2k−1b2−1 (` − 1) + bk. Then REIGD(d, f, b, k) outputs a ∈ Rk(`−1)+4w such that〈a,a〉 = d− f .
Moreover, REIGD(d, f, b, k) performs O(kw logw+ log2 d′ log log d′) arithme-
tic operations on integers of bitsize O(log d′) where d′ = d− b2k−1b2−1 (`− 1).
Proof. Let fe ∈ Rw be the even part of f . Let ai = bi−1 + xci(x2) where
ci ∈ Rw with ‖ci‖∞ < b and only its lower-half coefficients nonzero. Since
f(x) +
∑
i aia
?
i = f
′(x2) + b
2k−1
b2−1 , we inductively conclude that 〈a,a〉 = d − f .
A routine computation shows that f ′ = fe +
∑
i cic
?
i . Next, combining the fact
that ‖fg‖∞ ≤ w‖f‖∞‖g‖∞ for any f, g ∈ K2w and the same argument as in the
proof of Lemma 5, the correctness follows immediately.
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Algorithm 4 proceeds recursively. At the highest level, there is one gadget
decomposition of (−f¯o), k polynomial multiplications over Rw and one recursive
call. At the bottom level, there is one 4-square decomposition. Thus the total
complexity is O(kw logw + log2 d′ log log d′) if one uses FFT techniques during
multiplication, and all involved integers are of bitsize at most O(log d′). uunionsq
Lemma 10 implies a solution to IGDPR2w,1,B,d,m as the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Let `, B, d, b, k ∈ N and w = 2` ≥ 2 such that m = k(`−1)+4 and
d− b2k−1b2−1 (`−1) ≥ bk ≥ B+kwb2. Then there exists a solution to IGDPR2w,1,B,d,m
and it can be calculated by Algorithm 4.
The output of Algorithm 4 consists of a series of vectors built upon the tower
of rings followed by 4 integers, hence the storage can be essentially the same as
that of f due to the polynomials in the tower of rings being gradually sparser.
Detailed argument on the storage is given in Lemma 11.
Lemma 11. Let a be the output of Algorithm 4, then a can be stored using(
kw
2 log b+ 2 log(2d
′)
)
bits where d′ = d − b2k−1b2−1 (` − 1). In particular, when
d′ = O (‖f‖∞), the required storage is (w2 + 2) (log ‖f‖∞ +O(1)) bits.
Proof. The storage of (x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ Z4 is bounded by 2 log(2d′). We notice
that a1+jk+i = b
i + a′i,j
(
x2
`−2−j
)
for some a′i,j ∈ R2j+2 with even coefficients
being 0, odd coefficients in (−b, b), hence the storage of a1+jk+i is 2j log b and
then the storage of a is kw2 log b+ 2 log(2d
′). uunionsq
6.3 Decomposition for positive definite Σ′ ∈ Rn×n2w
We now show how to solve the generalized problem IGDPR2w,n,B,d,m. Our ring-
setting matrix decomposition is illustrated in Algorithm 5. The high level idea
is the same in spirit to Algorithm 3, except that we replace the Rabin-Shallit
algorithm with a decomposition based on ring gadgets (Algorithm 4). For Σ′ =
dIn − Σ ∈ Rn×n2w , one first calculates some T ∈ Rn×k2w such that TTt has the
same first row and column as Σ′, except the diagonal element, and then proceeds
iteratively over (Σ′ −TTt)2:n,2:n ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1)2w . During construction of T we
deal with off-diagonal elements by gadget decomposition, and decompose the
remaining diagonal element with Algorithm 4. Detailed analysis is shown in
Lemma 12.
Lemma 12. Algorithm 5 is correct. More precisely, let w = 2` ≥ 2 and Σ ∈
Rn×n2w be a symmetric matrix, let d, b, k ∈ Z such that bk ≥ ‖Σ‖max + knwb2
and d ≥ b2k−1b2−1 `+ bk. Then RMIGD(d,Σ, b, k) outputs A ∈ Rn×n(k`+4)2w such that
AAt = dIn −Σ.
Moreover, RMIGD(d,Σ, b, k) performs O(n3kw logw+n log2 d′ log log d′) arithme-
tic operations on integers of bitsize at most O(log d′), and A can be stored using(
n2
2 kw log b+ 2n log(2d
′)
)
bits where d′ = d− b2k−1b2−1 `.
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Algorithm 5: Integral matrix decomposition in ring setting
RMIGD(d,Σ, b, k)
Input: a symmetric matrix Σ ∈ Rn×n2w with w = 2` ≥ 2,
integers d, b, k ≥ 2 such that bk ≥ ‖Σ‖max + knwb2 and d ≥ b2k−1b2−1 `+ bk.
Output: A =
(
L1 · · · Lk D
) ∈ Rn×n(k`+4)2w such that AAt = dIn −Σ
where Li ∈ Rn×n2w is a lower-triangular matrix with diagonal elements being bi−1
and off-diagonal elements of `∞-norm less than b,
D ∈ Rn×n(k(`−1)+4)w is a block diagonal matrix with each block being the output
of REIGD(d, f, b, k) for some f ∈ R2w.
1: g← (1, b, · · · , bk−1)t ∈ Rk2w
2: x← REIGD(d− ‖g‖2,Σ1,1, b, k) ∈ Rk(`−1)+4w {Call to Algorithm 4}
3: if n = 1 then
4: return (gt,xt)
5: end if
6: for j = 2, · · · , n do
7: calculate cj ∈ Rk2w such that 〈cj ,g〉 = −Σ1,j by gadget decomposition
8: end for
9: C← (c2 · · · cn )t ∈ R(n−1)×k2w , T← (gt xtC
)
∈ Rn×(k`+4)2w
10: Π← (Σ + TTt)
2:n,2:n
11:
(
L′1 · · · L′k D′
)← RMIGD(d,Π, b, k) {Recursive call}
12:
(
v′1 · · · v′k
)← C
13: Li ←
(
bi−1
v′i L
′
i
)
∈ Rn×n2w for i = 1, · · · , k
14: D←
(
xt
D′
)
∈ Rn×n(k(`−1)+4)2w
15: return A =
(
L1 · · · Lk D
)
Proof (sketch). A routine computation shows that ‖CCt‖max ≤ kwb2. Following
the same argument as the proof of Lemma 5, we confirm the correctness.
According to Lemma 10, all involved integers are of bitsize at most O(log d′),
and the complexity is mainly contributed by (1) the gadget decompositions, (2)
calls to Algorithm 4 and (3) matrix multiplications. More specifically, there are
O(n2) times gadget decompositions, hence the total complexity of this part is
O(kwn2). There are n calls to Algorithm 4 that entirely costs O(nkw logw +
n log2 d′ log log d′) according to Lemma 10. Furthermore, the cost of all matrix
multiplications is bounded by O(kn3w logw). To sum up, the running time of
RMIGD(d,Σ, b, k) is dominated by O(n3kw logw + n log2 d′ log log d′).
From Lemma 11, the storage of D is n
(
kw
2 log b+ 2 log(2d
′)
)
and that of each
Li is
n(n−1)
2 w log b. The overall storage thus is
(
n2
2 kw log b+ 2n log(2d
′)
)
. uunionsq
Corollary 4. Let `, B, d, b, k ∈ N and w = 2` ≥ 2 such that m = k` + 4 and
d− b2k−1b2−1 ` ≥ bk ≥ B + knwb2. Then there exists a solution to IGDPR2w,n,B,d,m
and it can be calculated by Algorithm 5.
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Lemma 13 shows a result related to the smoothness condition. Arguments in
the proof of Lemma 9 still apply to the ring setting due to the similar structure
of the output Gram root. The minor difference is that we should use the `2-norm
to measure the “size” of each entry that is a ring element instead of an integer.
Therefore we omit the proof.
Lemma 13. Let A′ = RMIGD(d,Σ, b, k) ∈ Rn×m2w with w = 2` ≥ 2 and m =
n(k`+ 4). and A =
(
InwMw(A′)
) ∈ Znw×(n+m)w, then
λmw(Λ
⊥(A)) ≤ max
b2√nw,
√
d− b
2k − 1
b2 − 1 `+ b
k + 1
 .
The idea of eigenvalue reduction (Section 4.2) is compatible with the ring
setting as well, if one replaces the approximate Cholesky Gram root by some
structure-preserving Gram root, e.g. the Denman–Beavers one or the Babylonian
one [DN12a]. Additionally, for Algorithm 4, one may also subtract some gg?
approximation to f at the beginning, and then work on a small polynomial.
6.4 Comparison between the generic and ring algorithms
Combining the eigenvalue reduction and Algorithm 5, a ring-based integral de-
composition is available. Based on it, one can devise a perturbation sampler for
the ring case. Here we skip detailed arguments and just present the comparison
between the ring-based sampler and the generic one (see Table 4). We recall the
following notations:
– ` ∈ N, w = 2`, n ∈ N and N = nw.
– Σ ∈ Rn×n2w is a symmetric matrix over R2w that is identified with a symme-
tric matrix over ZN×N . We focus on the case of e1(Σ) = ω(N7).
– s′2 ∈ N and s′2 > e1(Σ) + 1.
– M ∈ N such that the integral Gram root A = ( IN A′ ) ∈ ZN×(N+M).
– L ∈ N is an upper bound of λM (Λ⊥(A)). The base samplings include DZ,L′r
and DZ,r,c with c ∈ 1L′ · Z, where L′ ≈ L.
Note that in both the generic and ring cases, the parameter L = O(s′) and
the minimal Gaussian width smin = (1 + o(1))
√
e1(Σ). Thus we do not include
them in Table 4.
As a conclusion, our ring-based integral decomposition reduces the required
memory by a factor of O(w) but increases the number of centered base samplings
(i.e. M) by O(logw). The smoothness condition and the quality of the output
Gaussian are asymptotically the same in two kinds of samplers.
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